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UCC Section 2-714(1) and the Lost-
Volume Theory: A New Remedy for
Middlemen?
Recently, the New York Court of Appeals utilized a lost-
volume analysis combined with the buyers' remedy provisions
of the Umform Commercial Code [hereinafter U C.C.] to ben-
efit a middleman buyer.1 Fertico Belgium S. A. [hereinafter
Fertico] sued its supplier, Phosphate Chemicals Export Asso-
ciation [hereinafter Phoschem], for breach of contract for the
late delivery of fertilizer 2 Phoschem's breach forced Fertico to
buy more costly fertilizer from another supplier to fulfill an
existing contractual obligation to a customer.3 When the late-
delivered Phoschem fertilizer arrived, Fertico accepted it and
later profitably resold it to another customer 4
The court allowed Fertico to recover damages5 from Phos-
chem for the increased cost of the cover contract even though
I Fertico Belgium S. A. v. Phosphate Chemicals Export Ass'n., Inc., 510 N.E.2d
334 (N.Y. 1987). See infra notes 2-15 and accompanying text for a discussion of the
facts of the Fertico case.
2 Fertico, 510 N.E.2d at 335-36. The Fertico litigation involved several compli-
cated commercial transactions. In October 1978, Fertico Belgium S. A. [hereinafter
Fertico] entered into a contract with Phosphate Chemicals Export Association [here-
inafter Phoschem] in which Phoschem agreed to supply Fertico with two shipments
of fertilizer. The first shipment was to be 15,000 tons delivered by Nov 20, 1978,
and the second was to be 20,000 tons delivered by Nov. 30, 1978. In early November
of 1978, Phoschem informed Fertico that the first shipment would not arrive by the
contract date, although Fertico had already paid for it. Fertico had not paid for the
second shipment and decided to cancel it after Phoschem informed Fertico of the
delay. Id.
Id. Fertico had to have a timely delivery to fulfill its contract with Altawreed,
Iraq's agricultural ministry. The belated shipment arrived on Dec. 17, 1978, too late
for the Fertico-Altawreed contract. Because Phoschem had informed Fertico that the
shipment would be late, Fertico acquired substitute fertilizer from another supplier,
Unifert, in mid-November. Fertico supplied Altawreed with the fertilizer purchased
from Unifert. Id.
4 Id. Fertico sold the late-delivered Phoschem fertlizer to another company,
Janssens, for a profit of $454,000 on March 19, 1979. Id. at 336.
1 Id. The court found that damages were recoverable under UmrOiRm COMmER-
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Fertico accepted and profitably resold the late-delivered goods.6
Additionally, the court allowed Fertico to keep the profit from
the subsequent resale of the Phoschem fertilizer 7 The court did
not allow Phoschem an offset for the resale profits, because
"[tihis offset, on these particular facts, would [have] severely
disadvantage[d] Fertico, a trader in fertilizer who both buys
and sells, and who would have pursued such commercial trans-
actions had there been no breach by Phoschem." 8 Although
the court did not use the term "lost volume," the reasoning it
employed to deny an offset was identical to the lost-volume
seller theory 9 The court recognized that its "decision [did] not
fit squarely within the available remedies urged by the
dissent" 10 but found the general remedial scheme of the U C.C.
broad enough to accommodate its rationale."
CIAL CODE § 2-712 (1978) [hereinafter U.C.C.], because "Fertico exercised its right as
the wronged buyer-trader to cover in order to obtain the substitute fertilizer it required
to meet its obligation under its Altawreed contract. " Fertico, 510 N.E.2d at 337.
See U.C.C. § 2-712, comment 1. (All cites to the U.C.C. will be from the 1978 Official
Text.)
6 Fertico, 510 N.E.2d at 337-38. The cover contract with Unifert cost $700,000
more than the original contract with Phoschem. Id. at 336.
7 Id. at 337-38.
1 Id. at 338.
9 See mnfra notes 19-83 and accompanying text for a discussion of the lost-
volume theory.
10 Fertico, 510 N.E.2d at 338.
" The court relied upon U.C.C. §§ 1-106, 2-714(1). The court found that U.C.C.
§ 1-106
directs that the remedies provided by the [U.C.C.] should be liberally
administered so as to put the aggrieved party in as good a position as if
the other party had fully performed. Had Phoschem fully performed,
Fertico would have had the benefit of the Altawreed transaction and, as
a trader of fertilizer, the profits from the Janssen's sale as well.
Fertico, 510 N.E.2d at 338. Again, the court used language and reasoning of lost-
volume cases.
Although the cover remedy of U.C.C. § 2-712 is usually unavailable for one who
accepts goods, the court relied on U.C.C. § 2-714(1) to support its award of cover
damages:
Fertico learned of Phoschem's breach after Phoschem had negotiated
Fertico's $1.7 million letter of credit, which constituted complete payment
for the first shipment. With no commercially reasonable alternative,
Fertico took custody of the first shipment but cancelled the second .,
having previously notified Phoschem of its breach (U.C.C. § 2-607). The
loss resulting to Fertico by having to acquire cover, even in the face of
its acceptance of a late-delivered portion of the fertilizer, is properly
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The court allowed a recovery of cover damages under U C.C.
section 2-712 even though Fertico accepted the late-delivered
goods.' 2 The court allowed this recovery based on a broad
reading of U.C.C. section 2-714(1), which allows a buyer to
recover damages "resulting in the ordinary course of events
from the seller's breach as determined in any manner which is
reasonable. 11 3 Few courts-and even fewer commentators-
have discussed this Code provision.1 4 Of those who have dis-
cussed U C.C. section 2-714, none has interpreted the section
as broadly as did the Fertico court when it allowed a middleman
buyer both to retain the profit from the resale of late-delivered
goods and to recover cover damages.1 5
The Fertico court's unique combination of the lost-volume
theory, U.C.C. section 2-714(1), and the cover remedy of U C.C.
section 2-712 raises several interesting questions. This Note
addresses the following three questions: (1) Can courts utilize
Fertico's lost-volume analysis in a manner that is consistent
with the elements and theories underlying other lost-volume
seller cases and lost-profit buyer cases?' 6 (2) Does an award of
cover damages and the retention of profit derived from the
resale of late-delivered goods give a windfall to a middleman?' 7
(3) In what cases might courts properly apply the Fertico anal-
ysis?'8
I. THE LOST-VOLUME SELLER THEORY
Phoschem sought an offset for the profit Fertico earned on
the resale of the late-delivered goods, arguing that if the goods
recoverable under § 2-714(i).
Fertico, 510 N.E.2d at 338.
12 Id.
,3 U.C.C. § 2-714(1).
14 See infra notes 125-64 and 213-34 and accompanying text for a discussion of
U.C.C. § 2-714 and the authorities that interpret the section.
,1 Fertico, 510 N.E.2d at 338-39.
,6 See infra notes 19-197 and accompanying text for a discussion of lost-volume
seller cases and lost-profit buyer cases.
17 See infra notes 235-40 and accompanying text for a discussion of the windfall
given by the Ferlico court.
" See mnfra notes 241-53 and accompanying text for a discussion of the types of
cases in which the Fertico analysis might apply.
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KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
had been delivered in a timely fashion, Fertico would have sold
them under its existing resale contract and would not have had
the goods on hand to make a second sale. 19 Phoschem reasoned
that the late delivery actually made it possible for Fertico to
have two resales instead of one. 20 Therefore, Phoschem argued
that the profit Fertico earned on the resale of the late-delivered
goods constituted "expenses saved in consequence of the
seller['s] breach, ' 21 and therefore should have been deducted
from damages otherwise recoverable under U C.C. section 2-
712.22
The Fertico court denied the offset because had Phoschem
delivered the fertilizer in a timely manner, Fertico would have
resold it under its existing contract and would have sought
other supplies for the subsequent resale. 23 Therefore, the late
delivery neither caused additional profits nor created "expenses
saved in consequence of the seller's breach." 24 In essence, the
court used the lost-volume seller theory to benefit a middleman
buyer 25 Although other courts have allowed aggrieved middle-
men to recover lost profits from sellers and retain profits earned
notwithstanding sellers' breaches 2 6 none has used the language
and reasoning of lost-volume seller cases to achieve these goals.
Therefore, the lost-volume seller theory is the most convenient
starting point for an analysis of the Fertico rationale. Cases27
,1 Fertico Belgium S. A. v. Phosphate Chemicals Export Ass'n., Inc., 510 N.E.2d
334, 338 (N.Y. 1987).
2o Id.
21 Id. at 337
22 Id. at 338.
13 Id. at 338-39.
24 Id.
" See infra notes 30-83 for a discussion of the lost-volume theory.
26 See infra notes 84-197 for a discussion of lost-profit buyer cases.
27 See generally Famous Knitwear Corp. v. Drug Fair, Inc., 493 F.2d 251 (4th
Cir. 1974) (holding that seller of sweaters was entitled to lost-profits analysis under
U.C.C. § 2-708(2) (1978), if seller was lost-volume seller); Comeq, Inc. v. Mitternight
Boiler Works, Inc., 456 So. 2d 264 (Ala. 1984) (holding machine tool seller entitled
to damages based on lost profits from buyer's breach though seller sold same machine
to third party); Snyder v. Herbert Greenbaum and Assoc., Inc., 380 A.2d 618 (Md.
1977) (remanding case to trial court for determination of whether seller was lost-
volume seller); Neri v. Retail Marine Corp., 285 N.E.2d 311 (N.Y 1972) (holding that
seller of boats was entitled to lost profits caused by buyer's breach notwithstanding
resale at the same price that buyer's had contracted to pay, because seller had adequate
supply to sell to both; therefore, second buyer did not replace first buyer).
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and commentaries 28 regarding the lost-volume seller theory are
plentiful, and one easily can observe the elements of a lost-
volume recovery in cases where a seller 29 is the aggrieved party
A. The Theory
Basically, a lost-volume seller is one who loses a sale, and
hence a profit, because of a buyer's breach. 30 A seller loses
volume when his buyer breaches and "the seller resells to a
buyer who would have bought from the seller even if there had
been no breach of the original contract.''31 There are implicit
"conditions ' 32 within this simple statement: (1) the seller would
have sought an additional sale absent the breach; 33 (2) the seller
would have made an additional sale absent the breach; 34 and
23 See generally Childres & Burgess, Sellers Remedies: The Primacy of UCC 2-
708(2), 48 N.Y.U. L. REv. 833 (1973) (suggesting that the lost-profits formula of
U.C.C. § 2-708(2) should be the primary formula for seller's remedies); Goldberg, An
Economic Analysis of the Lost-Volume Retail Seller, 57 S. CAL. L. REv 283 (1984)
(applying economic analysis to U.C.C. § 2-708(2) for retail sales); Harris, A Radical
Restatement of the Law of Seller's Damages: Sales Act and Commercial Code Results
Compared, 18 STAN. L. Rav 66 (1965) (criticizing U.C.C. § 2-708 for lack of
specificity); Schlosser, Construing UCC Section 2-708(2) to Apply to the Lost-Volume
Seller, 24 CASE W REs. L. REv 686 (1973) (providing a "construction of section 2-
708 which achieves the drafters' goal of providing the lost-volume seller with full
damages recovery. " Id. at 686); Schlosser, Damages for the Lost-Volume Seller:
Does an Efficient Formula Already Exist?, 17 U.C.C. L.J. 238 (1985) (providing
economic analysis and overview of other commentators' analyses of U.C.C. § 2-708(2)
and the lost-volume seller theory); Goetz v. Scott, Measuring Seller's Damages: The
Lost-Profits Puzzle, 31 STAN. L. REv 323 (1979) (looking with disfavor upon lost-
profits formula of U.C.C. § 2-708(2)).
- Obviously, a middleman acts as both a buyer and a seller. Within this Note
the term "seller" is used to identify cases in which the aggrieved party is suing in his
capacity as a seller. Similarly, the term "buyer" refers to one suing as a buyer.
30 See generally J. WmaT & R. SumMERs, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW UNDER THE
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 7-9 (2d ed. 1980) (providing general description of lost-
volume theory).
1, Id. at § 7-7, 271 n.56 (citing Harris, supra note 28, at 80-87, and J. WumT
& R. SUMmaRS, supra note 30, at § 7-9).
31 Harris, supra note 28, at 82.
3 Id. Professor Harris explains that this first condition satisfies at least two
concerns: (1) it proves that the plaintiff did solicit someone; and (2) it proves that the
plaintiff had not "reached his limit of volume because he could not handle more
business without expansion of his plant or drastic revision of his mode of doing
business." Id.
-, Id. Professor Harris explains that the second condition has "probative value
where the resold entity is fungible." Id. at 83.
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(3) the seller had the capacity to make an additional sale."
These conditions appear repetitious. Each condition states, in
essence, that the seller must have made an additional sale absent
the breach.16 Practically, though, these conditions provide an
analytical framework that courts use to adjudicate lost-volume
claims.
3 7
B. The Code
The adoption of the U C.C. provided an opportunity for
sellers to recover from breaching buyers the foregone profits
from lost-volume transactions.3 8 Specifically, U C.C. section 2-
70839 provides two damage formulas under which sellers can
" Id. at 82 ("Where it is shown that plaintiff was unable to perform an
additional contract obviously no volume has been lost that would not have been
lost even without breach and resale." Id. at 83).
16 See generally id. at 82-83.
37 Professor Harris explains how the conditions and other evidence help guide
courts in lost-volume cases:
If before trial plaintiff in fact resold a specified entity scheduled
for defendant, this resale purchaser can be identified at the trial. If there
was no actual resale, the court must determine whether the purchasers
available at the time plaintiff should have resold would have met the
three conditions. Inferences drawn from the original contract with defen-
dant and the general nature of plaintiff's business are relevant to that
determination. Where there is an actual resale, evidence establishing
plaintiff's plans should be admitted to determine whether plaintiff would
have solicited the purchaser had there been no breach.
Id. at 82 n.79. See infra notes 54-72 and accompanying text for a discussion of the
analytical framework used by the courts in actual lost-volume seller cases.
I .Id. at 83 ("There is only one Sales Act case in which it is clear that the court
comprehended the lost volume phenomenon, and in that case the court refused to
take it into account." Id. (citation omitted)).
39 U.C.C. § 2-708 reads as follows:
§ 2-708 Seller's Damages for Non-acceptance or Repudiation
(1) Subject to subsection (2) and to the provisions of this Article
with respect to proof of market price (Section 2-723), the measure of
damages for non-acceptance or repudiation by the buyer is the difference
between the market price at the time and place for tender and the unpaid
contract price together with any incidental damages provided in this
Article (Section 2-710), but less expenses saved in consequence of the
buyer's breach.
(2) If the measure of damages provided in subsection (1) is inade-
quate to put the seller in as good a position as performance would have
done then the measure of damages for non-acceptance is the profit
(including reasonable overhead) which the seller would have made from
[VOL. 77
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seek recovery for non-acceptance or repudiation by a buyer40
(1) section 2-708(1) provides "a market-damages formula based
on the market price at the time and place for tender;" ' 4' and
(2) section 2-708(2) provides "a profit based formula based on
the profit the seller expected to realize on the deal.''42 The
profit-based formula is applied43 only when the market-damages
section is "inadequate to put the seller in as good a position
as performance would have done." 44 U C.C. section 2-708 has
stirred much debate. 45
Although the authors of the U C.C. provided little guidance
concerning when the lost-profit analysis of U C.C. section 2-
708(2) should apply, 46 courts47 and commentators 48 have con-
cluded that the section is applicable to the lost-volume seller 49
the full performance by the buyer, together with any incidental damages
provided in this Article (Section 2-710), due allowance for costs reason-
ably incurred and due credit for payments or proceeds of resale.
40 Id; see also Schlosser, Construing UCC Section 2-708(2) to Apply to the Lost-
Volume Seller, supra note 28, at 687-88 (providing the lost-volume seller with two
damage formulas); Schlosser, Damages for the Lost-Volume Seller: Does an Efficient
Formula Already Exist?, supra note 28, at 238 (examining economic analyses by other
commentators on U.C.C. § 2-708 and providing introductory description of U.C.C. §
2-708).
4 Schlosser, Damages for the Lost- Volume Seller: Does an Efficient Formula
Already Exist?, supra note 28, at 238.
42 Id.
,3 U.C.C. § 2-708(2).
" Id.
41 See supra note 28.
, Comment 2 to U.C.C. § 2-708 explains:
The provision of this section permitting recovery of expected profit
including reasonable overhead where the standard measure of damages
is inadequate, together with the new requirement that price actions may
be sustained only where resale is impractical are designed to eliminate
the unfair and economically wasteful results arising under the older law
when fixed price articles were involved. This section permits the recovery
of lost profits in all appropriate cases, which would include all standard
priced goods. The normal measure there would be list price less cost to
the dealer or list price less manufacturing cost to the manufacturer. It is
not necessary to a recovery of "profit" to show a history of earnings,
especially if a new venture is involved.
U.C.C. § 2-708 comment 2.
4' See infra notes 54-72 and accompanying text for a discussion of cases applying
U.C.C. § 2-708(2) to lost-volume sellers; see also cases cited supra note 27
" See supra note 28.
,1 See supra notes 30-37 and accompanying text for a discussion of the lost-
volume seller theory.
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Therefore, a seller may resell goods a buyer has refused to
accept and seek the profit of the lost sale.50
One interesting aspect of U C.C. section 2-708 is the lan-
guage in the second comment, which suggests that goods dealt
with under the lost-profit section be "standard priced."'- This
language has been criticized as being misleading. 52 The proper
inquiry under U C.C. section 2-708(2) is "not the 'standard
pricedness' of the goods the seller is selling -53 but rather
is whether a sale, and hence a profit, is lost because of a
buyer's breach.
C. The Cases
The best known lost-volume seller case is Neri v. Retail
Marine Corp.54 In Neri, the New York Court of Appeals ad-
dressed an ideal lost-volume situation 5 and applied "[tihe new
statute' 56 to allow a seller to recover lost profits. The seller,
51 See infra notes 54-72 and accompanying text for a discussion of cases applying
U.C.C. § 2-708(2) to lost-volume sellers.
,1 See U.C.C. § 2-708 comment 2 (supra note 46).
52 J. WHITE & R. SU1MMERS, supra note 30, at § 7-9.
11 Id. White and Summers show the futility of basing a lost-volume claim on
the "standard pricedness" of goods:
If the seller is in a market in which the demand for the product
exceeds the available supply ., he will lose nothing when one party
breaches, and he should recover no damages even if his goods are
"standard priced." By the same token when his goods are not standard
priced but he loses one sale as a result of one buyer's breach, he needs
more than the contract-market differential on the resale to put him in
the same economic position as performance would have; he needs the
profit on the sale he lost that year.
Id.
5 285 N.E.2d 311 (N.Y 1972).
51 See supra notes 30-37 and accompanying text for a general discussion of the
lost-volume seller theory.
56 Nert, 285 N.E.2d at 313. The court was referring to the U.C.C. The court
specifically addressed the change wrought by the new lost-profits analysis of U.C.C.
§ 2-708(2):
Prior to the code, the New York cases "applied the 'profit' test,
contract price less cost of manufacture, only in cases where the seller
[was] a manufacturer or an agent for a manufacturer" (1955 Report of
N.Y. Law Rev. Comm., vol. 1, p. 693). Its extension to retail sales was
"designed to eliminate the unfair and economically wasteful results ans-
ing under the older law when fixed price articles were involved. This
[VOL. 77
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Retail Marine Corporation [hereinafter Retail Marine], con-
tracted to sell a new boat to the buyer, Anthony Neri [herein-
after Neri], for $12,587 40.57 Neri made a deposit of $4,250
and, within six days, breached the contract.58 Retail Marine
refused to return Neri's deposit, although it was eventually able
to resell the boat for the price Neri had contracted to pay 59
Neri sued to recover the deposit, and Retail Marine counter-
claimed for the lost profits. 60
The court held that Retail Marine was entitled to the profit
on the lost sale and incidental damages "for storage, upkeep,
finance charges and insurance for the period between the date
performance was due and the time of resale. "61 The court
quoted at length a commentary that construed section 2-708(2)
of the U C.C. in a hypothetical situation similar to that pre-
sented by the facts of Ner. 62 The Neri court did not explain
section permits the recovery of lost profits in all appropriate cases, which
would include all standard priced goods."
Ner, 285 N.E.2d at 313-14.
Neri, 285 N.E.2d at 312.
, Id.
, Id. Retail Marine sold the boat four months after Neri's breach. Id.
o Id.
11 Id. at 314-15. The court cited U.C.C. § 2-708(2) (see supra note 39) to support
its award of lost profits and noted that under U.C.C. § 2-710 the code allows a seller
to recover incidental damages.
61 Noting that it was "illustrative of the operation of the rules," the court
quoted Dean Hawkland's work:
[I]f a private party agrees to sell his automobile to a buyer for $2000, a
breach by the buyer would cause the seller no loss (except incidental
damages, i.e., expenses of a new sale) if the seller was able to sell the
automobile to another buyer for $2000. But the situation is different
with dealers having an unlimited supply of standard-priced goods. Thus,
if an automobile dealer agrees to sell a car to a buyer at the standard
price of $2000, a breach by the buyer injures the dealer, even though he
is able to sell the automobile to another for $2000. If the dealer has an
inexhaustable supply of cars, the resale to replace the breaching buyer
costs the dealer a sale, because, had the breaching buyer performed, the
dealer would have made two sales instead of one. The buyer's breach,
in such a case, depletes the dealer's sales to the extent of one, and the
measure of damages should be the dealer's profit on one sale. Section 2-
708 recognizes this, and it rejects the rule developed under the Uniform
Sales Act by many courts that the profit cannot be recovered in this
case.
Id. (citing W HAWKLAND, SALES AND BULK SALES 153-54 (1958)).
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the requirements of U C.C. section 2-708(2) in depth but found
that Retail Marine had lost a sale and a profit because of Neri's
breach. 63 Other courts have addressed section 2-708(2) in more
detail 4
In Comeq, Inc. v Mitternight Boiler Works, Inc. ,65 the
Alabama Supreme Court discussed the application of U C.C.
section 2-708(2) to redress an aggrieved middleman seller. The
court found that certain evidence was dispositive of the ques-
tion of whether a buyer's breach caused lost-volume damage. 66
The plaintiff, Comeq, Incorporated [hereinafter Comeq] or-
dered an "angle bending roll ' 67 which it had contracted to
resell to Mitternight Boiler Works, Incorporated [hereinafter
Mitternight]. Mitternight breached its contract to purchase the
machinery, and Comeq resold it to a third party 65 The court
held that Comeq was entitled to recover lost profits under
U C.C. section 2-708(2).69 Although Comeq was not a manu-
facturer of the machinery, "[t]he record reveal[ed] that, prior
to the contract with Mitternight, Comeq had sold approxi-
mately 300 angle bending rolls, and after the contract date sold
numerous others. '" 70 Therefore, evidence of Comeq's business
practices before and after the breach revealed that Comeq
would have been able to fulfill the resale contract and, indeed,
would have done so absent the breach. 7' This evidence fulfilled
the evidentiary conditions necessary for Comeq to prove it had
lost a sale and provided a reason for the court to award lost-
volume profits. 72
63 Id.
6 See infra notes 65-72 and accompanying text.
61 456 So. 2d 264 (Ala. 1984).
Id. at 268-69.
67 Id. at 265. An angle bending roll "is used in the steel fabricating industry to
roll angles, channels and beams into circular shapes to be used for supports." Id. at
265.
Id. at 266.
69 Id. at 269.
70 Id. at 268.
71 Id. at 268-69.
72 See supra note 32; see supra notes 30-37 and accompanying text for a discus-
sion of the conditions necessary for a recovery of lost-volume profit.
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D Lost- Volume Rationale and Middlemen
The Fertico case involved a middleman suing its supplier 7
The Fertico court apparently realized that a middleman is both
a buyer and a seller Courts often apply the lost-volume theory
to benefit an aggrieved middleman who sues a breaching buyer 74
It should follow that a middleman who sues a breaching seller
ought to be allowed to avoid a setoff against profits made after
a breach, if the middleman had the capacity to make the same
or even more profit had there been no breach.
The facts in the Comeq case, 7- and the reasoning employed
by the Comeq court, were very similar to the facts and reason-
ing in Fertico 76 The middleman buyer in Fertico was able to
prove that it had the capacity to make two sales even if Phos-
chem had delivered the fertilizer on time.77 Although the Fertico
court's use of the lost-volume theory was unique in that it
benefited a middleman buyer, such use of the theory was not
extreme. Because the Phoschem goods arrived too late for
Fertico to resell them under an existing resale contract, Fertico
purchased substitute goods to avoid breaching its resale con-
tract.7 8 The court concluded that Fertico's resale of the late-
delivered goods-its second resale within a period of four
months-was not a sale made possible by the breach, because
Fertico had the capacity to make two sales within the period
of time involved even if there had been no breach.7 9 As in the
Comeq case,8 0 the majority of the Fertico court examined the
73 Fertico, 510 N.E.2d at 335.
74 See supra notes 30-72 and accompanying text for a discussion of cases applying
the lost-volume rationale to benefit middlemen sellers.
71 See supra notes 65-72 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Comeq
case.
76 Fertico, 510 N.E.2d at 335. The only substantive difference in Fertico was
that the middleman was suing as a buyer Id.
" The Fertico court concluded that Fertico "would have pursued such commer-
cial transactions had there been no breach by Phoschem." Id. at 338. Apparently, the
court came to this conclusion based upon two facts: (1) Fertico was in the business
of buying and selling fertilizer; and (2) Fertico completed two transactions while
burdened with Phoschem's late delivery. Id.
78 Id.
79 Id.
10 Comeq, 456 So. 2d 264; see supra notes 65-72 and accompanying text for a
discussion of the Comeq case.
1988-89]
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capacity of the middleman and concluded that it would have
purchased a second shipment of goods to fulfill a second sale
had the Phoschem goods been delivered in a timely manner
and resold under the first contract. 81
The dissenting opinion in Fertico expressed doubts about
whether Fertico would have made two resales absent Phos-
chem's breach.8 2 To conclude, as the dissent did, that Fertico
would not have made a second profitable resale absent the
breach appears irrational. Such thinking suggests that Fertico,
after a timely delivery, would have suspended its business ac-
tivities for no reason. The dissent also suggested that a mid-
dleman suing as a buyer should not be allowed to use a lost-
volume analysis. However, courts have evaluated the selling
capacity of middlemen sellers to determine if they were in a
position to make an additional sale absent a breach. 3 Merely
because a middleman is suing in his role as a buyer is not a
Fertico, 510 N.E.2d at 338.
s2 Id. at 339 (Titone, J., dissenting). The dissenting opinion vigorously attacked
the majority's analysis, suggesting that courts cannot properly apply a lost-volume
theory to benefit buyers because "[middlemen buyers] cannot, by definition, be said
to have an unlimited supply of goods at (their] disposal for resale," and because
"[middlemen are] at the mercy of the wholesale market's price fluctuations." Id. at
340-41. Because of these factors, the dissent was uncertain whether Fertico would have
made a second resale had there been no breach. Also, because the market conditions
absent a breach may have affected the profit Fertico could have earnedif it had made
two independent resales, the dissent felt uneasy with the majority's conclusion that
the profit made on the resale of the late-delivered goods equaled the profit it would
have otherwise earned. Id. Therefore, the dissent would not have allowed Fertico to
keep the resale profit.
Although the dissent was correct in pointing out the difficulties inherent in
applying a lost-volume rationale to buyers, the dissent's solution would have created
even greater difficulties. Although Fertico did not keep "an unlimited supply" of
fertilizer on its warehouse floor, by making two purchases and two sales while
burdened with Phoschem's breach, Fertico showed that it had the capacity to carry
through with two buy/sell transactions.
Although market conditions might have affected the profit Fertico would have
earned had there been no breach, it is more desirable to allow the aggrieved party to
retain approximately the same profit it would have earned absent a breach, rather
than to allow the breaching party to recover it. Under the dissent's analysis, even if
the profit Fertico made on the resale of the late-delivered goods was less than the
profit it could have earned absent the breach, the breaching seller is credited for it.
This line of reasoning is not desirable.
" See supra notes 54-72 and accompanying text for a discussion of cases in
which courts evaluate the selling capacity of middlemen sellers.
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sufficient reason to deny application of the same theory he
would be allowed to utilize if he were suing as an aggrieved
seller
II. BUYERS AND LOST PROFITS
Although the Fertico court relied on the lost-volume theory
to determine the fate of profits earned by a middleman buyer, 4
it could have looked instead to lost-profit buyer cases to reach
its conclusion.8 5 No case expressly refers to a "lost-volume
buyer," but courts have allowed buyers to recover lost profits
in cases that are roughly analogous to lost-volume seller cases.8 6
Just as a seller may recover the profit of a sale that was lost
because of a buyer's breach, so a buyer may recover the profit
lost as a consequence of a seller's breach. Although buyers
seek lost profits in sundry situations8 7 and under numerous
U C.C. provisions,88 the keystone of most claims of this type
is U C.C. section 2-715.89
Fertico Belgium S. A. v. Phosphate Chemicals Export Ass'n., Inc., 510 N.E.2d
334, 337-38 (N.Y. 1987); see supra notes 1-15 and accompanying text for a description
of the Fertico case.
11 See infra notes 90-197 and accompanying text for a discussion of lost-profit
buyer cases.
16 See id., see also supra notes 54-72 and accompanying text for a discussion of
lost-volume seller cases.
7 See infra notes 105-97 and accompanying text for a discussion of the sundry
situations in which buyers seek lost profits; see also R. DUNN, REcoVERY oF DAMAGES
FOR LOsT-PRoFITS §§ 2.1, 2.3, 2.4 (3d ed. 1987) (providing excellent overview of cases
in which buyers seek lost profits).
" See U.C.C. §§ 2-712(2), 2-713(1), 2-714(3).
19 U.C.C. § 2-715 reads as follows:
Buyer's Incidental and Consequential Damages
(1) Incidental damages resulting from the seller's breach include
expenses reasonably incurred in inspection, receipt, transportation and
care and custody of goods rightfully rejected, any commercially reason-
able charges, expenses or commissions in connnection with effecting cover
and any other reasonable expenses incident to the delay or other breach.
(2) Consequential damages resulting from the seller's breach include
(a) any loss resulting from general or particular requirements and needs
of which the seller at the time of contracting had reason to know and
which could not be reasonably prevented by cover or otherwise; and (b)
injury to any person or property proximately resulting from any breach
of warranty.
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A. UCC Section 2-715 and Consequential Damages
U C.C. section 2-715 defines buyers' incidental and conse-
quential damages. 90 As described in section 2-715, buyers' in-
cidental damages are very similar to sellers' incidental damages
as described in U C.C. section 2-710, 91 but the definition of
consequential damages has no counterpart in sellers' remedies. 92
U C.C. section 2-715(2) defines consequential damages as
"(a) any loss resulting from general or particular requirements
and needs of which the seller at the time of contracting had
reason to know and which could not reasonably be prevented
by cover or otherwise; and (b) injury to person or property
proximately resulting from any breach of warranty 93 The
words "any loss" could be interpreted to give an aggrieved
buyer a free hand in asserting claims were it not for the more
restrained words that follow them. Section 2-715(2) encourages
the mitigation of damages in that consequential damages cannot
be recovered if they reasonably could have been "prevented by
cover or otherwise." ' 94 Additionally, the seller must have had
"reason to know" of the buyer's needs.9 5 Although the lan-
guage of section 2-715(2) is more relaxed than the language of
the pre-Code "tacit agreement" test, which required that the
seller have actual knowledge of the buyer's needs, 96 the "reason
to know" requirement can still serve to restrain the recovery
90Id.
9, U.C.C. § 2-710 reads as follows:
Seller's Incidental Damages
Incidental damages to an aggrieved seller include any commercially
reasonable charges, expenses or commissions incurred in stopping deliv-
ery, in the transportation, care and custody of goods after the buyer's
breach, in connection with return or resale of the goods or otherwise
resulting from the breach.
92 One might consider the lost-profits section (U.C.C. § 2-708(2)) to be a rough
counterpart; see supra note 39 for the text of U.C.C. § 2-708.
-, U.C.C. § 2-715(2).
9" See J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 30, at § 10-4, 395-96 (providing
explanation of mitigation principle in U.C.C. § 2-715(2)).
95 U.C.C. § 2-715(2).
96 See J. WmTE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 30, at § 10-4. White and Summers
present an excellent summary of the "tacit agreement" test and a good discussion of
consequential damages; see also U.C.C. § 2-715, comment 2 (discussing foreseeability
rule of the section as compared to "tacit agreement" test).
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of consequential damages.9 7 When one sells to a middleman
buyer, courts may presume that one knows, at the time of sale,
of the middleman's needs. 98
Courts99 and commentators'00 have had little difficulty con-
cluding that U C.C. section 2-715(2) is applicable in lost-profit
buyer cases. Courts have allowed buyers to recover lost profits
under this section in numerous situations, 01 including (1) when
the buyer loses a resale profit due to a lack of available cover; 10 2
(2) when the buyer accepts a non-conforming tender that causes
a loss of profit; 10 3 and (3) when the buyer covers under U C.C.
section 2-712 and, notwithstanding the cover, loses profit. 1 4
Each of these situations is examined below
1. Lost Profits Without Cover
A number of courts have allowed buyers to recover lost
profits in cases not involving cover 105 Some of these opinions
97 See generally Anderson, The Cover Remedy, 6 J.L. & CoM. 155, 199 (1986)
(citing Gerwin v. Southeastern California Ass'n of Seventh Day Adventists, 92 Cal.
Rptr. 111 (1971) as example of failure under the foreseeability requirement, but noting
rarity of such failures).
91 See R. DUNN, supra note 87, at § 2.3, 61.
" See infra notes 105-97 and accompanying text for a discussion of cases using
U.C.C. § 2-715(2) in lost-profit buyer cases.
10Q See R. DUNN, supra note 87, at §§ 2.1, 2.16-2.19; W HAWKLAND, SALES AND
BULK SALES 176 (1976); J. WHITE & R. SuaMRs, supra note 30, at 10-4, 391-93;
Anderson, supra note 97, at 197-200.
M' See infra notes 105-97 and accompanying text for a discussion of the situations
in which courts have allowed buyers to recover lost profits; see generally R. DUNN,
supra note 87, at §§ 2.1-2.3.
102 See infra notes 105-24 and accompanying text.
101 See infra notes 125-64 and accompanying text.
104 See infra notes 165-97 and accompanying text.
101 See, e.g., State Office Sys. v. Olivetti Corp. of Am., 762 F.2d 843 (10th Cir.
1985) (affirming decision that buyer could not have covered, and therefore, could
recover lost profits under U.C.C. § 2-715 notwithstanding lack of cover); Larsen v.
A.C. Carpenter, Inc., 620 F Supp. 1084 (E.D.N.Y. 1985), aff'd, 800 F.2d 1128 (2d
Cir. 1986) (allowing aggrieved buyers to recover lost profits for a portion of contract
goods not covered, but assessing offset for portion covered and profited from); Bende
and Sons, Inc. v. Crown Recreation, Inc., 548 F Supp. 1018 (E.D.N.Y 1982), aff'd,
722 F.2d 727, (2d Cir. 1983) (allowing buyer lost profits although no cover actually
was obtained. The court found that Bende made a good faith effort to obtain cover
yet none was available); Allied Canners & Packers, Inc. v. Victor Packing Co., 209
Cal. Rptr. 60 (Ct. App. 1984) (allowing middleman buyer to recover lost profits, but
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have addressed U C.C. section 2-713106 in relation to the recov-
ery of lost profits. 0 7 These cases are relevant to a discussion
of U C.C. section 2-715(2) because they highlight the require-
ment of that section, which allows an award of consequential
damages only if the loss "could not reasonably be prevented
by cover or otherwise. ",108
In Bende & Sons, Inc. v Crown Recreation, Inc., 109 a
middleman buyer, Bende & Sons, Incorporated [hereinafter
Bende], contracted to purchase combat boots from Crown Rec-
reation, Incorporated [hereinafter Crown], in order to resell
them to the government of Ghana." 0 When Crown failed to
deliver the boots, Bende sought substitute supplies."' Despite
Bende's efforts, it was unable to procure substitute boots quickly
enough to placate the government of Ghana, whose troops
urgently needed suitable footwear Consequently, the govern-
ment purchaser cancelled its order because of the delay "2
Bende sued Crown, seeking the profit it would have made
had Crown delivered the boots.1 3 The court quoted U C.C.
denying damages under U.C.C. § 2-713); Sun Maid Raisin Growers v. Victor Packing
Co., 194 Cal. Rptr. 612 (Ct. App. 1983) (involving partial cover); La Villa Fair v.
Lewis Carpet Mills, Inc., 548 P.2d 825 (Kan. 1976) (holding that middleman who
rejected for non-conformity may revoke and recover lost profits).
See infra notes 165-97 and accompanying text for a discussion of cases involving
cover.
106 U.C.C. § 2-713 reads as follows:
Buyer's Damages for Non-Delivery or Repudiation
(1) Subject to the provisions of this Article with respect to proof of
market price (Section 2-723), the measure of damages for non-delivery
or repudiation by the seller is the difference between the market price at
the time when the buyer learned of the breach and the contract price
together with any incidental and consequential damages provided in this
Article (Section 2-715), but less expenses saved in consequence of the
seller's breach.
(2) Market price is to be determined as of the place for tender or,
in cases of rejection after arrival or revocation of acceptance, as of the-
place of arrival.
107 See infra notes 109-24 and accompanying text; see also R. DUNN, supra note
87, at §§ 2.1-2.3.
M U.C.C. § 2-715(2)(a).
,09 548 F Supp. 1018 (E.D.N.Y. 1982).
1o Id. at 1019-20.
11 Id. at 1020.
12 Id.
11 Id. at 1022.
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sections 2-713 and 2-715 in awarding Bende the profit lost due
to Crown's breach."14 Although Bende failed to cover, the court
found that "Bende did make a good faith effort to order
substitute boots from other suppliers. ",,5 The good faith
effort apparently satisfied the express condition of U C.C.
section 2-715(2)(a) that consequential damages not be awarded
if they could have been "reasonably prevented by cover
or otherwise.""116
The Bende court did not thoroughly address the issue of
whether the breaching seller had to know of the resale contract.
It did note, however, that Crown "conceded that it was aware
when it contracted with Bende, that Bende was going to resell
the boots."''17 Additionally, the court failed to address ade-
quately the potential windfalls present in the market-price for-
mula of U C.C. section 2-713. Rather, the court used the
"difference between the breached contract price and the resale
contract price" to establish the amount of lost profits."18
Allied Canners & Packers, Inc. v Victor Packing Co."19
addressed in more detail the issue of a court's proper response
when an aggrieved buyer seeks recovery under a Code section
that would give the buyer a windfall. In Allied, Victor Packing
Company [hereinafter Victor] breached its contract to sell two
shipments of raisins to Allied Canners & Packers, Incorporated
[hereinafter Allied]. Allied had contracted to resell the raisins
but did not cover after Victor's breach. 2 0 Instead, Allied sued,
seeking damages under the contract price-market price formula
of U.C.C. section 2-713 121 Because the market price of raisins
had tripled at the time of Victor's breach, U C.C. section 2-
713 presented Allied a golden opportunity to recover more than
it would have made had the raisins been delivered and resold
as originally planned. 2
"4 Id. at 1022-23.
"I Id. at 1022.
116 U.C.C. § 2-715(2)(a).
"1 Bende, 548 F Supp. at 1022.
I Id.
"' 209 Cal. Rptr. 60 (Ct. App. 1984).
110 Id. at 61.
2I Id. at 62.
11 Id. at 62-63.
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The court did not allow Allied to recover damages under
this formula but did allow Allied the profit it lost because of
the breach. 123 Obviously, had the court allowed Allied the much
larger contract price-market price differential, Allied would
have been in a better financial position than it would have been
had the original contract been completed. The court correctly
concluded that such recovery would violate the general remedial
goal of the U C.C.24
2. UCC Section 2-714 and Lost Profits
The Fertico court relied, in part, on U.C.C. section 2-714
which allows buyers to recover damages caused by accepted
goods. 125 Although section 2-714 allows recovery of lost profits
as consequential damages, 126 the Fertico court handled the profit
question via a lost-volume analysis.' 27 Indeed, the Fertico court
ignored U C.C. section 2-714(3)12 which deals with profits, and
relied only on the first subsection of U C.C. section 2-714.129
Although a more detailed analysis of the court's combination
of U C.C. section 2-714(1) with the cover remedy of U C.C.
section 2-712 is presented below,' 30 an analysis of judicial in-
123 Id. at 63-66.
124 Id. at 66; see also U.C.C. § 1-106.
12 See generally W HAwmL"AD, supra note 100, at 172-77 (providing an overview
of buyer's remedies after acceptance).
26 U.C.C. § 2-714 reads as follows:
Buyer's Damages for Breach in Regard to Accepted Goods
(1) Where the buyer has accepted goods and given notification
(subsection (3) of Section 2-607) he may recover as damages for any non-
conformity of tender the loss resulting in the ordinary course of events
from the seller's breach as determined in any manner which is reasonable.
(2) The measure of damages for breach of warranty is the difference
at the time and place of acceptance between the value of the goods
accepted and the value they would have had if they had been as war-
ranted, unless special circumstances show proximate damages of a dif-
ferent amount.
(3) In a proper case any incidental and consequential damages under
the next section may also be recovered.
127 Fertico, 510 N.E.2d at 338-39; see also supra notes 1-15 and accompanying
text for a discussion of the Fertico analysis.
'2 See infra notes 213-34 and accompanyng text for a discussion of Fertico's
unique interpretation of U.C.C. § 2-714.
229 Fertico, 510 N.E.2d at 338-39.
230 See infra notes 213-34 and accompanying text for a discussion of the court's
interpretation of U.C.C. § 2-714.
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terpretation of U.C.C. section 2-714 and its relationship to
questions of profit is pertinent to an examination of Fertico's
profit analysis.
U.C.C. section 2-71413i contains two basic formulas for
buyers who have accepted non-conforming goods: (1) for breach
of warranty, a buyer may recover "the difference at the time
and place of acceptance between the value of the goods ac-
cepted and the value they would have had if they had been as
warranted;"'13 2 and (2) for a non-conforming tender, a buyer
may recover "the loss resulting in the ordinary course of events
from the seller's breach as determined in any manner which is
reasonable.""' 3 In addition to these basic formulas, under sub-
section (3) of U C.C. section 2-714,134 buyers may recover in-
cidental and consequential damages as described in U.C.C.
section 2-715 I's
The formula for non-conformity of tender refers both to
breaches of warranty and to "any failure of the seller to
perform according to the obligations under the contract." ' 0 6
Therefore, the "reasonable" recovery section refers to damages
resulting from any non-conformity of tender 13 Under this
formula, a buyer must prove that any claimed damages were
"the ordinary, foreseeable result of the breach."13 8
A number of appellate courts have discussed U.C.C. section
2-714.131 Of these courts, none has interpreted the first subsec-
'M See supra note 126 for the text of U.C.C. § 2-714.
32 See id. at subsection (2); see also J. WroTE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 30, at
§ 10-2.
M- See U.C.C. § 2-714(1).
114 See id. at subsection (3).
"I See supra note 89 for the text of U.C.C. 2-715.
136 U.C.C. § 2-714, comment 2.
" W HAWKLAND, supra note 100, at 174.
139 Id.
"I See, e.g., Lackawanna Leather Co. v. Martin & Stewart, Ltd., 730 F.2d 1197
(8th Cir. 1984) (buyer, under U.C.C. § 2-714(1), can recover damages determined in
any reasonable manner, and mathematical certainty is not required); Mead Corp. v.
McNally-Pittsburg Mfg. Corp., 654 F.2d 1197 (6th Cir, 1981) (buyer, notwithstanding
cover, can recover for expenses reasonably incurred to cure breach); T. J. Stevenson
& Co., v. 81,193 Bags of Flour, 629 F.2d 338 (5th Cir. 1980) (applying U.C.C. § 2-
714(1) to case in which goods deteriorated while in buyer's possession); Ralston Purina
Co. v. Hartford Acc. & Inctem. Co., 540 F,2d 915 (8th Cir. 1976) (buyer's election
to accept non-conforming goods did not cut off action against seller under U.C.C. §
1988-89]
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tion as broadly as did the Fertico court-allowing a middleman
2-714(1, 3)); United States of America for the Use of Fram Corp. v. Crawford, 443
F.2d 611 (5th Cir. 1971) (aggrieved buyer failed to present enough evidence to recover
lost profits under U.C.C. § 2-714(1)); In re Lamica Corp., 65 Bankr. 849 (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. 1986) (cost of repair of non-conforming goods was reasonable measure of
damages under U.C.C. § 2-714(1)); United Cal. Bank v. Eastern Mountain Sports,
Inc., 546 F Supp. 945 (D. Mass. 1982), aff'd, 705 F.2d 439 (1st Cir. 1983) (allowing
buyer an offset equal to buyer's lost profits under U.C.C. § 2-714(1)); In re O.P.M.
Leasing Services, 61 Bankr. 596 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1981) (U.C.C. § 2-714(1) inappli-
cable to damages sustained through lease of goods); Omaha Pollution Control Corp.
v. Carver-Greenfield Corp., 413 F Supp. 1069 (D. Neb. 1976) (city was allowed
incidental and consequential damages under U.C.C. § 2-714(1, 2) notwithstanding
acceptance of non-conforming goods); American Elec. Power Co., Inc. v. Westing-
house Elec. Corp., 418 F Supp. 435 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (incidental and direct damages
recoverable under U.C.C. §§ 2-714 and 2-715(1) if evidence at trial proved breach of
warranty); D'Orsay Equipment Co. v. U.S. Rubber Co., 199 F Supp. 427 (D. Mass.
1961), aff'd, 302 F.2d 777 (1st Cir. 1962) (plaintiff buyer failed to show defects
constituting breach of warranty); Jones v. Atkins, 494 S.W.2d 448 (Ark. 1973) (U.C.C.
§ 2-714(1) is inapplicable where goods were not accepted); Distnct Concrete Co., Inc.
v. Bernstein Concrete Corp., 418 A.2d 1030 (D.C. 1980) (damages for reasonably
foreseeable injuries caused by non-conforming tender are reasonably recoverable under
U.C.C. § 2-714); GNP Commodities, Inc. v. Walsh Heffernan Co., 420 N.E.2d 659
(Ill. App. Ct. 1981) (instruction for damages under U.C.C. § 2-714(1) should not be
given until "the time for rejection and revocation of acceptance has passed. ");
J.D. Pavlak, Inc. v. Ahern, 352 N.E.2d 774 (Ill. App. Ct. 1976) (damages recoverable
under U.C.C. § 2-714 can be limited by contract); Michiana Mack., Inc. v. Allendale
Rural Fire Protection Dist., 428 N.E.2d 1367 (Ind. Ct. App. 1981) (expenses for
retention of non-conforming goods are not recoverable under U.C.C. § 2-714); Auto-
Teria, Inc. v. Ahern, 352 N.E.2d 774 (Ind. Ct. App. 1976) (recovery of "incidental
and foreseeable consequential damages for breach of warranty" is allowable and
reasonable under U.C.C. § 2-714(1)); S.C. Gray, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 286 N.W.2d
34 (Mich. Ct. App. 1979) (interpreting the damage formulas of U.C.C. § 2-714);
Fablok Mills, Inc. v. Cocker Mach. & Foundry Co., 310 A.2d 491 (N.J. Super. Ct.
App. Div. 1973), cert. denied, 315 A.2d 405 (N.J. 1973) (continued use of goods did
not waive claims under U.C.C. § 2-714); Carbo Ind., Inc. v. Becker Chevrolet Inc.,
491 N.Y.S.2d 786 (N.Y. App. Div. 1985) (cost of.engine to replace defective engine
"could have been found to be a reasonable cost in rendering" defective car usable.
Id. at 790); F.D. Rich Housing Corp. v. KPJ Associates, 461 N.Y.S.2d 422 (N.Y.
App. Div. 1983) (applying damages for breach of warranty under U.C.C. § 2-714(1,
2)); V Zappala & Co., Inc. v. Pyramid Co. of Glens Falls, 439 N.Y.S.2d 765 (N.Y.
App. Div. 1981); Nassau Suffolk White Trucks, Inc. v. Twin County Transit Mix
Corp., 403 N.Y.S.2d 322 (N.Y. App. Div. 1978) (claims of impairment of reputation
and punitive damages for willful breach are not recoverable under U.C.C. § 2-714(1));
Falker v. Chrysler Corp., 463 N.Y.S.2d 357 (N.Y Civ. Ct. 1983) (allowing recovery
of damages for breach of implied warranties under U.C.C. § 2-714); Palmer v. Safe
Auto Sales, Inc., 452 N.Y.S.2d 995 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1982) (translating "non-conformity
of tender" from U.C.C. § 2-714(1) to include bad faith modification of contract);
Wooten v. Motorola Comm. & Electronics, Inc., 488 P.2d 1284 (Okla. 1971) (failure
of notification under U.C.C. § 2-607 bars action under U.C.C. § 2-714(1)); R. I.
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buyer to profitably resell late-delivered goods (with retention
of the profits under a lost-volume analysis) and recover cover
damages for higher priced replacement goods. 140 Some courts,
though, have discussed the recovery of profit under U C.C.
section 2-714.141
In Hall v Miller,142 Hall, a dairy farmer, sued a dealer
from whom he had purchased cows infected with brucellosis.143
Due to the resulting infection of Hall's dairy herd, 40 cows
had to be killed, and Hall's dairy was quarantined. Hall sought
damages for the reduced price he received for the 40 cows and
for lost profits on the quarantined dairy 144
Due to the reduction of herd size caused by the seller's
breach, the court upheld an award for lost profits. 145 The
reduced number of cows produced less milk and hence, less
profit. 46 The court, relying on U C.C. sections 2-714(2) and 2-
715(2), found that "the measure of damages for a buyer when
the seller breaches a warranty may include both the price dif-
ference between goods delivered and the goods expected,
[U C.C. section 2-714], and any incidental and consequential
damages including lost profits [U C.C. section 2-715]." 47 Un-
der the Hall analysis, the consequential damages referred to in
U C.C. section 2-714(3) include profits lost because of a breach
of warranty and can be awarded in addition to damages cal-
culable under U C.C. section 2-714(2).148
Lampus Co. v. Neville Cement Prods. Corp., 336 A.2d 397 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1975),
aff'd, 378 A.2d 288 (Pa. 1977) (allowing buyer of defective blocks to charge seller
with costs of disposal); Wismewski v. Great At. & Pac. Tea Co., 323 A.2d 744 (Pa.
Super. Ct. 1974) ("special circumstances showing proximate damages of a different
amount will alter the rule," which measures damages as the "difference between the
value of the goods accepted and their value as warranted, at the time of acceptance."
Id. at 747); Agway, Inc. v. Teitscheid, 472 A.2d 1250 (Vt. 1984) (buyer's notice of
breach under U.C.C. § 2-607(3)(a) was insufficient; therefore, damages under U.C.C.
§ 2-714(1) were unavailable).
,,0 See supra notes 1-15 for a more detailed discussion of the Fertico decision.
41 See supra note 139; see also infra notes 142-64 and accompanying text.
1,2 465 A.2d 222 (Vt. 1983).
141 Id. at 224.
'" Id.
14' Id. at 225-28.
"6 Id. at 227.
" Id. at 227-28.
148 Id.
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Although there are a number of cases that interpret U C.C.
section 2-714 as a whole, 49 very little case law interprets the
first subsectionI50 of the provision in relation to lost profits.
There are cases, however, in which courts have held that section
2-714(!) allows an award of damages in addition to those
available under the second subsection."' Also, there is at least
one case holding that U C.C. section 2-714(1), taken alone,
provides only a recovery of expenses incurred to cure a breach. 5 2
In Mead Corp. v McNally-Pittsburg Mfg. Corp.,' the
defendant, McNally-Pittsburg Manufacturing Corporation
[hereinafter McNally], contracted to sell a coal washing facility
to Mead Corporation [hereinafter Mead], but failed to complete
the facility by the contractual date. 5 4 Mead sued for breach of
contract, and a jury awarded $510,000 in damages to Mead.155
McNally appealed the jury award, claiming that the jury
had awarded consequential damages despite the fact that the
contract entered into excluded consequential damages. 156 The
Mead court agreed that the contract between the parties ex-
cluded consequential damages but found that there were non-
consequential damages which equaled or exceeded the jury
award; therefore, McNally was unable to show that the general
damage award contained consequential damages. 57
"4 See supra note 139.
o See U.C,C, § 2-714, supra note 126.
'" See, e.g., J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 30, at § 10-2, n.3 (citing Acme
Pump Co., Inc. v. National Cash Register Co., 337 A.2d 672 (Conn. 1974) and
Cambern v. Hubbling, 238 NW,2d 622 (Minn. 1976)). The Acme court held that the
plaintiff could recover the cost of a judgment rendered in another case caused by
defendant's delivery of defective goods based upon UC,C. § 2-714(i), in addition to
damages under the formula of U.C,C. § 2-714(2). Acme, 337 A.2d at 677. The
Cambern court upheld a jury instruction that 'it is much more reasonable to measure
damages by the expense. , "' of correcting a faulty tender than merely by the formula
of U.C,C. § 2-714(2). Cambern, 238 N.W.2d at 625 (noting that "[tihe Minnesota
Code Comment states that subsection (1) is applicable 'where special circumstances
show proximate damages of a different amount than those called for by subsection 2-
714(2)."' Id. at 625, n.5).
412 See Mead, 654 F.2d 1197; see also infra notes 153-63 and accompanying text.
1,3 654 F.2d 1197 (6th Cir. 1981).
"I Id. at 1198.
VI Id. at 1199.
1,, Id.
11 Id. at 1206-11,
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In the course of its opinion, the Mead court described the
types of damages that may be awarded under U C.C. section
2-714(1), as distinguished from those found in U C.C. section
2-715(2). The court noted that U C.C. section 2-714 "differ-
entiates between damages 'resulting in the ordinary course of
events from the seller's breach' U.C.C. § 2-714(1) and 'any
incidental and consequential damages under the next sec-
tion. ' [U C.C.] § 2-714(3)."1 58 The court found that con-
sequential damages are not "incurred in order to cure the
immediate defect in performance,"' 5 9 but "usually encompass
lost profits expected under contracts between the aggrieved
party and third parties, and other expenses not incurred in
order to cure the immediate defect in performance." 160 Because
Mead had to spend large amounts of money to cure the defect
in McNally's performance, these expenses fit the description of
damages "resulting in the ordinary course of events from the
seller's breach ' 1 61 and were recoverable notwithstanding the
contractual exclusion of consequential damages .162
The Mead decision indicates that U C.C. section 2-714(1)
alone will not allow the recovery of consequential (lost-profit)
damages. This decision, however, was based on a contract that
excluded the award of consequential damages. 63 Most cases
apply U C.C. section 2-714 as a whole and allow the recovery
of consequential damages as well as expenses related to curing
a faulty tender '64
3. UCC Section 2-712, Cover, and Lost Profits
Under U C.C. section 2-712,165 an aggrieved buyer may
purchase goods to replace those a seller failed to deliver.166 The
" Id. at 1209, n.17
119 Id. (citing J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 30, at 318-21).
160 Id.
161 U.C.C. § 2-714(1).
162 Mead, 654 F.2d at 1209-11.
16 Id. at 1201.
"6 See supra note 139.
16, U.C.C. § 2-712 reads as follows:
"Cover"; Buyer's Procurement of Substitute Goods.
(1) After a breach within the preceding section the buyer may
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buyer may then recover "from. the seller as damages the dif-
ference between the cost of [the] cover and the contract price
together with any incidental or consequential damages ., but
less expenses saved in consequence of the breach." 167 This
section allows a buyer "to meet his 'essential need."' 168 The
buyer may replace the goods originally sought and charge the
breaching seller with any increase in cost necessitated by the
breach. In most cases, this formula will put a buyer "in as
good a position as if the [seller] had fully performed," 169 with-
out resorting to incidental or consequential damages under
U C.C. section 2-715 170 If an aggrieved buyer is able to procure
similar goods quickly, then there is little likelihood of lost
profits or other consequential damages.171 There are situations,
though, in which buyers may seek more than the difference
between the cover price and the contract price as suggested by
U C.C. section 2-712. 172
A number of courts have addressed the ability of buyers to
obtain both cover damages and lost profits. 17 3 Basically, if a
"cover" by making in good faith and without unreasonable delay any
reasonable purchase of or contract to purchase goods in substitution for
those due from the seller.
(2) The buyer may recover from the seller as damages the difference
between the cost of cover and the contract price together with any
incidental or consequential damages as hereinafter defined (Section 2-
715) but less expenses saved in consequence of the seller's breach.
(3) Failure of the buyer to effect cover within this section does not
bar him from any other remedy.
66 Id. The buyer may also recover damages under U.C.C. § 2-712 if the seller
delivers, but the buyer rejects or revokes acceptance. Id.
167 Id.
"68 J. WrTa & R. SuMNMRS, supra note 30, at § 6-3, 216.
169 U.C.C. § 1-106(1).
170 J. WHITE & R. SUMrMRS, supra note 30, at § 6-3, 216.
171 Id.
72 See infra notes 173-87 and accompanying text for a discussion of the situations
in which a buyer may seek more than the cover price-contract price differential.
173 See, e.g., Chemetron Corp. v. McLouth Steel Corp., 381 F Supp. 245 (N.D.
Ill. 1974), aff'd, 522 F.2d 469 (7th Cir. 1975) (allowing lost-profits award and cover
damages in situation involving insufficient delivery); Larsen, 620 F Supp. 1084 (al-
lowing farmers' organization lost-profits award for seller's failure to deliver seed
potatoes but requiring 30 percent reduction in award for members who covered,
planted, and reaped profits notwithstanding breach); Atlan Ind., Inc. v. O.E.M., Inc.,
555 F Supp. 184 (D.C. Okla. 1983) (denying lost-profits award because it merely
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seller's breach caused a profit loss to the buyer notwithstanding
the buyer's cover contract, courts will allow the buyer to re-
cover the lost profit. Of course, as indicated in U C.C. section
2-712(2), this recovery is subject to the requirements of U.C.C.
section 2-715 174
Chemetron Corp. v McLouth Steel Corp.175 provides an
excellent example of a case where the buyer recovered damages
for both lost profits and cover expenses. Chemetron Corpora-
tion [hereinafter Chemetron] contracted to purchase a mini-
mum of 975 tons of liquid nitrogen and oxygen from McLouth
Steel Corporation [hereinafter McLouth] .i76 McLouth, in turn,
promised to ship up to 1,950 tons of the product per month if
Chemetron requested that amount. The parties entered into the
contract in 1964 and renewed the contract in 1970.177 After the
renewal, McLouth consistently failed to provide the amount of
gas needed by Chemetron for resale to its customers.' 78 There-
fore, Chemetron sought the product from additional sources
to bolster the inadequate amount supplied by McLouth. 179 De-
spite these efforts, Chemetron could not procure enough of the
product to fully supply its customers and therefore had to
"institute an allocation program under which its customers
received only 50 to 80 percent of their needs."' 180 The court
recognized that Chemetron could not have cancelled its contract
with McLouth without doing itself even more harm.'
represented the increased cost of cover contract that had already been awarded to
buyer); Alliance Tractor & Implement Co. v. Lukens Tool & Die Co., 281 N.W.2d
778 (Neb. 1979) (allowing buyer lost profits only for portion of loss that could not
have been prevented by cover).
17, See supra notes 90-98 and accompanying text.
" 381 F Supp. 245 (N.D. Ill. 1974).
76 Id. at 249.
177 Id.
"I Id. at 250.
'79 Id.
190 Id.
I d. The court explained:
Under these circumstances it would have been commercially unfeas-
ible for Chemetron to cancel its contract with McLouth notwithstanding
McLouth's breaches, for Chemetron would obviously have been in an
even worse position and less able to serve its customers if it had received
no product at all from McLouth instead of the quantities, however
insufficient, that McLouth made available.
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The replacement product that Chemetron purchased from
other suppliers was more costly than McLouth's. Therefore,
Chemetron sued seeking damages for the difference between
the cover price and the contract price as measured under U C.C.
section 2-712,82 and damages under U C.C. section 2-715(2)
for the profit lost because of the reduced volume of the resale
contracts. 8 3 The court allowed Chemetron to recover both. 18 4
The court determined that the proper calculation of the lost
profit was "the average selling price [in the resale area] less
both the price Chemetron would have paid McLouth and a pro
rata share of Chemetron's distribution costs."'' 8
Obviously, the Chemetron decision was carefully crafted to
place the aggrieved middleman in the same position it would
have been absent the breach. 86 Had the court not allowed
Chemetron to recover the difference between the cover price
and the contract price, Chemetron would have lost the amount
it paid for the higher priced goods; likewise, without a recovery
of lost profits, Chemetron would have lost the profit it other-
wise would have made from resales of the product. iS7
The facts of the Chemetron case were ideal for an award
of both cover expenses and lost profits. Other courts have
refused to award both cover and lost-profit damages when such
awards would give aggrieved buyers a windfall.'88 In Atlan
Industries, Inc. v O.E.M., Inc.,1189 a court allowed a buyer to
recover cover damages but refused to award lost profits to the
buyer. 90 Atlan Industries, Incorporated [hereinafter Atlan],
contracted to sell plastic products to O.E.M., Incorporated
[hereinafter O.E.M.],19i but delivered defective goods. There-
fore, O.E.M. revoked its previous acceptance and covered by
182 Id. at 258.
183 Id.
'" Id. at 258-59.
8S Id. at 259.
186 The general remedial goal of the U.C.C. is to place the aggrieved party in the
same position it would have been had there been no breach. U.C.C. § 1-106.
1 See generally Chemetron, 381 F Supp. at 249-50.
188 See supra note 173; see also infra notes 189-97 and accompanying text.
189 555 F Supp. 184 (D.C. Okla. 1983).
110 Id. at 191.
"I Id. at 186.
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purchasing more costly goods from General Electric.' 92 Because
of the higher cost of the cover goods, the court allowed O.E.M.
to recover damages under the cover remedy of U C.C. section
2-712.'19 O.E.M. also sought lost-profit damages because it lost
money on the resale of the higher priced cover goods. 194 The
court denied recovery of this amount, finding that the lost
profit on the resale was caused only by the higher cost of the
replacement goods. 19 Because the court had already awarded
O.E.M. an amount equal to the increased cost of cover, "[had]
the court award[ed] [O.E.M.] a recovery for lost-profits .,
[O.E.M.] would [have] enjoy[ed] a double recovery "196
Since the award of cover damages was, in itself, an award of
the profit lost on the transaction, any further award would
have created a windfall.' 97 Although the Atlan court differed
from the Chemetron court on the question of lost profits, both
courts attempted to place an aggrieved middleman buyer in the
same position that it would have been absent the seller's breach.
III. TrE FERTICO AMALGAMATION
The Fertico'98 court combined several strands of the law
regarding buyers' and sellers' remedies. Each of these will be
examined in light of the sources discussed above and with
regard to the unique interpretation used by the Fertico court.' 99
Additionally, a simplified economic analysis of the Fertico
decision will be presented to measure the effect of the court's
rationale. 200
192 Id. at 187
"I Id. at 189.
Id. at 190.
'9 Id. at 191. The court stated: "To the extent that [O.E.M.] lost profits on its
contract with its customer, the court finds that the lost-profits were solely due to the
increased cost for [the product] from General Electric." Id.
1" Id.
197 Id.
"I Fertico Belgium S. A. v. Phosphate Chemicals Export Ass'n., Inc., 510 N.E.2d
334 (N.Y. 1987).
I" See infra notes 201-34 and accompanying text.
2w See infra notes 235-40 and accompanying text.
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A. Fertico's Lost- Volume Rationale
Fertico accepted late-delivered goods although they arrived
too late to be resold under Fertico's existing resale contract. 20 1
Fertico kept the goods and later resold them at a profit.20 2 The
court allowed Fertico to keep the profit from the resale of the
late-delivered goods, because "[h]ad Phoschem fully per-
formed, Fertico would have had the benefit of the [first
resale] and, as a trader of fertilizer, the profit from the
[second resale] as well." 203
Disregarding the remainder of the court's opinion, 2 4 this
reasoning is sound. In the area of sellers' remedies, an ag-
grieved seller may recover for a profit that was lost because of
a buyer's breach even if the seller resold the same product, if
the seller had the capacity to make a second sale had the breach
not occurred.205 Other courts have allowed middlemen buyers
to recover for profits that were lost because of a seller's
breach.206 Each of the substantive buyer's remedy provisions of
the U C.C.207 allows the recovery of consequential damages,
which have been interpreted to include lost profits. 208 Addition-
ally, at least one court has allowed a middleman buyer to retain
the profit made from the resale of goods delivered in an insuf-
ficient amount in addition to recovering other damages.20 9
Therefore, if a middleman buyer makes a profit that it would
have made absent the seller's breach, surely it should be allowed
to retain the profit.
By adopting a rationale similar to those presented in lost-
volume seller cases and lost-profit buyer cases, the Fertico court
20? Fertico, 510 N.E.2d at 336.
202 Id.
210 Id. at 338.
2' See infra notes 213-33 for a discussion of other portions of this opinion.
20, See supra notes 30-72 and accompanying text for a discussion of the lost-
volume theory and cases applying it to aggrieved sellers.
106 See supra notes 84-197 and accompanying text for a discussion of cases in
which buyers sought lost profits and other damages under U.C.C. §§ 2-712, 2-713, 2-
714, and 2-715.
207 See supra notes 84-197 and accompanying text.
200 See supra notes 84-197 and accompanying text for a discussion of cases that
interpret consequential damages as including lost profits.
109 See supra notes 175-87 and accompanying text.
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apparently concluded that the middleman would have pur-
chased the replacement goods, or similar goods at the same
price, to fulfill the second resale contract had there been no
breach.210 Without explanation, the court concluded that the
cost of the second purchase of fertilizer would have been the
same whether or not a breach had occurred.2 1 Although this
reasomng properly led the court to conclude that Fertico's
profit on the two transactions was the same as it would have
been absent the breach, and to allow Fertico to keep the resale
profit from the late-delivered goods, it is incompatible with an
additional award of cover damages. 212
B. UCC Section 2-714(1) and "Cover" Within Fertico
The Fertico court allowed a middleman to recover under
the cover remedy of U C.C. section 2-712, even though that
section allows cover damages only when there has been "a
breach within the preceding section. '213 This statement limits
the cover remedy to breaches as defined in U C.C. section 2-
711: "[w]here the seller fails to make delivery or repudiates or
the buyer rightfully rejects or justifiably revokes accep-
tance. 91214 Although there was no breach as defined by
U C.C. section 2-711, the Fertico court held that "[t]he loss
resulting to Fertico by having to acquire cover, even in the face
of its acceptance of a late-delivered portion of the fertilizer, is
properly recoverable under section 2-714(1). ' ' 215 The Fertico
court relied on the language of U C.C. section 2-714(1), which
allows an accepting buyer to recover damages "for any non-
conformity of tender . in any manner which is reasona-
230 Ferico, 510 N.E.2d at 338. The court felt that "Fertico would have
pursued [these] commercial transactions had there been no breach by Phoschem." Id.
211 See infra notes 235-40 and accompanying text. The court apparently concluded
that the profit made from the two resales was the same as it would have been if there
had been no breach by Phoschem. In fact the Fertico court referred to the profit
made on the resale of the late-delivered goods as a "transactionally independent
profit." 510 N.E.2d at 338.
212 See infra notes 235-40 and accompanying text for a discussion of the windfall
provided by the court's analysis.
213 U.C.C. § 2-712(1).
214 U.C.C. § 2-711(1).
235 Fertico, 510 N.E.2d at 338.
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ble. 2 1 6 The court used the "reasonableness" standard of U C.C.
section 2-714(1) to give an accepting buyer the right to cover
damages and to eliminate the requirement of U C.C. section 2-
712 that cover only be awarded where there is a breach as
defined in U C.C. section 2-711.2 17
The Fertico court's combination of U C.C. sections 2-714(1)
and 2-712 to form a single remedy contradicts established schol-
arly thought. Although few cases 218 have discussed the cover
remedy of U C.C. section 2-712 in connection with the recovery
of damages caused by accepted goods as provided in U C.C.
section 2-714(1), Professors White and Summers have con-
cluded that the remedies provided by these two sections are
"mutually exclusive.''219 Additionally, Professor Hawkland 220
has addressed hypothetical situations similar to the facts of
Fertico221 and has concluded that buyers may recover under
U C.C. section 2-714(1) if they accept tenders that are non-
conforming because of insufficient or late deliveries, 222 but that
buyers accepting late deliveries may not recover cover damages.
The Fertico dissent quoted Hawkland:
In the case of a shortage of quantity, the buyer usually will
establish his damages by covering. That is to say, he will go
into the market and buy goods to substitute for those that
the seller wrongfully failed to deliver In the case of a
late shipment that otherwise conforms to the contract, the
accepting buyer has no need to cover.223
The dissenting justice agreed with Professor Hawkland that
buyers may recover under U C.C. section 2-714(1) for late
deliveries, but that cover "is used only to replace goods that
216 U.C.C. § 2-714(1) (emphasis added); see also supra notes 125-64 and accom-
panying text for a discussion of cases applying U.C.C. § 2-714.
217 See supra note 214 and accompanying text; see also U.C.C. § 2-712(1).
238 See supra notes 125-64 and accompanying text for a discussion of a few cases
that touch on U.C.C. § 2-714(1).
239 J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 30, at § 10-2, 375.
220 See Fertico, 510 N.E.2d 334, 340 (Titone, J., dissenting) (citing 3 W HAWK-
LAND, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE SERIES § 2-714:05, at 384-85).
223 See supra notes 1-15 and accompanying text for a discussion of the facts of
Fertico.
2n See W HAWKLAND, supra note 220, at 2-714:05.
2 Fertico, 510 N.E.2d at 340, n.2 (emphasis in original).
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were either not delivered or not accepted. ' '224 The dissenting
justice, however, failed to recognize that in commercial trans-
actions a late delivery can be as damaging as an insufficient
delivery or no delivery If a middleman buyer is forced to
replace goods that have not been delivered in time for the
intended resale to a third party, then the middleman buyer
should be allowed to recover the increased cost of the replace-
ment goods.
Whether a court should allow a middleman buyer to accept
and resell the late-delivered goods is a separate issue. On this
point, the dissent's hesitation in stretching the available U C.C.
remedies may have provided a more practical result than the
majority's unique analysis. Even accepting the majority's the-
ory of the "reasonable" recovery standard of U C.C. section
2-714(1) and the relaxed rules for the recovery of cover dam-
ages, Fertico's acceptance and resale of the late-delivered fer-
tilizer was unreasonable. The majority opinion stated that
Fertico had no choice but to accept the late-delivered fertilizer
because Fertico had paid for the goods on a letter of credit. 225
The majority did not adequately explain why Fertico could not
have rejected or revoked its acceptance of the late-delivered
goods. If Fertico had rejected the late-delivered goods and
covered, it could have sued for cover damages without relying
on U C.C. section 2-714. Fertico then could have purchased
even more fertilizer to fulfill the second resale contract rather
than disposing of the late-delivered fertilizer via the second
resale contract. 226
The dissent suggested that allowance of cover and retention
of resale profits created a double recovery 227 Rather than iden-
tify which rationale was improper, the dissent attacked both
the majority's lost-volume rationale228 and the award of cover
damages, 229 suggesting that Fertico should not be allowed to
224 Id.
22, Id. at 338.
26 Id. at 337-38. Fertico resold the late-delivered fertilizer to another company,
Janssens, and made a profit on the transaction. Id. at 336.
21 Id. at 339.
n See supra note 82 and accompanying text for a discussion of the dissent's
attack on the majority's lost-volume analysis.
21 See supra notes 223-24 and accompanying text for a discussion of the dissent's
attack on the majority's award of cover damages.
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keep the resale profits or to recover cover damages through the
majority's broad reading of U C.C. sections 2-714(1) and 2-
712.230 Although the dissent and the majority were not in agree-
ment on all elements of the case, both were partially correct.
The dissent correctly asserted that, under the facts of the case,
retention of the resale profits derived from late-delivered goods
and recovery of cover damages would lead to a windfall. 23' The
majority came to the correct conclusion concerning the dispo-
sition of the resale profits, 232 but created a windfall by stacking
cover damages on top of the retained profit.233 The following
simplified economic analysis of the Fertico case supports these
conclusions.234
C. The Economics of Fertico
To measure the effect of the Fertico court's decision, it is
easiest to supply hypothetical dollar amounts to analyze the
position Fertico would have been in both with and without
Phoschem's late delivery 235 Assume initially that Phoschem
(Seller One) timely delivered the fertilizer to Fertico (Middle-
man Buyer) for $400 and that Fertico resold it to Altawreed
(Ultimate Buyer One) for $600, earning $200 on the first trans-
action. If Fertico then purchased a similar amount of fertilizer
from Unifert (Seller Two) for $450 and resold it to Janssens
(Ultimate Buyer Two) for $750, Fertico would have earned
$300 on the second transaction. The total profit from the two
transactions absent Phoschem's late delivery would have been
$500:
230 See supra notes 213-17 and accompanying text for a description of the ma-
jority's rationale.
211 See infra notes 235-40 and accompanying text for a discussion of the windfall
resulting from the majority's analysis.
232 See supra notes 201-12 and accompanying text for a discussion of the court's
lost-volume rationale.
233 See infra notes 235-40 and accompanying text.
234 Id.
231 See supra notes 1-15 and accompanying text for the actual figures involved in
the case.
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Transaction One Transaction Two
Seller One Seller Two
$400 (cost) $450 (cost)
Middleman Middleman
$600 (resale) $750 (resale)
Ultimate Buyer One Ultimate Buyer Two
$200 Profit + $300 Profit
Total Profit $500
Now assume that Phoschem failed to deliver the $400 ship-
ment on time, but that Fertico accepted it. Assume that, to
fulfill its contract with Ultimate Buyer One, Fertico "covered"
by purchasing a similar amount of fertilizer from Seller Two
for $450 and resold it to Ultimate Buyer One for $600, earning
a profit of $150. Assume further that Fertico subsequently
resold the late-delivered Phoschem fertilizer to Ultimate Buyer
Two for $750, earning a profit of $350. The total profit from
the two intermixed transactions with a late delivery would be
$500:
Transaction One Transaction Two
Seller One Seller Two
$400 (cost) $450 (cost)
Middleman Middleman
$600 (resale) $750 (resale)
Ultimate Buyer One Ultimate Buyer Two
Profit on Goods acquired Profit on Goods acquired
from Seller Two = $150 + from Seller One = $350
Total Profit = $500
With a late delivery, the goods originally targeted to go to
Ultimate Buyer One go instead to Ultimate Buyer Two; like-
wise, the goods that would have gone to Ultimate Buyer Two
go instead to Ultimate Buyer One. Although the profit on each
transaction would differ from the profit on each transaction
absent a late delivery, the total profit would be the same
whether or not there is a late delivery of the first shipment. 23 6
236 See infra note 239.
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This holds true, whether or not there is a late delivery of the
first shipment, if two conditions remain constant: (1) the mid-
dleman would have paid the same price for the second supply;
and (2) the second resale contract would have been for the
same price. 237 Although the dissent expressed concern that the
market conditions would have been different had there been
no breach, and that the total profit from the two transactions
would have differed, 238 the majority concluded that if the first
shipment had been delivered timely, Fertico's total profit on
the two transactions would have been the same as it was with
a late delivery 239 If Fertico, indeed, earned the same total profit
with the breach as it would have absent the breach, and if
Fertico should be allowed to keep the profit derived from the
resale of the late-delivered goods, then an award of cover
damages in addition to the retained profit represents a wind-
fall.20
IV WHERE MIGHT THE FERTICO ANALYSIS APPLY9
Although the Fertico decision 241 allowed a double recov-
ery 2 42 there may be situations where a middleman should be
allowed to keep resale profits from late delivered goods and
recover a portion of the increased cost of replacement goods.
To keep profits derived from the resale of late-delivered goods,
13 These "conditions" are merely a more detailed manner to determine whether
the total profit would have differed.
238 See supra note 82.
13 Fertico, 510 N.E.2d at 338. The court made several statements which indicate
that the profit would have been the same with or without the late delivery, and that
the costs of the purchase contracts would have been the same. The court referred to
the profit Fertico made on the resale of the late-delivered fertilizer as "transactionally
independent. " Id. The court stated that had the late-delivered fertilizer arrived
on time, "Fertico would have had the benefit of the Altawreed transaction and, as a
trader of fertilizer, the profits from the Janssens' sale as well." Id. (emphasis added).
If Fertico, without the late delivery, would have had "the profits from" the second
resale absent the late delivery, then the late delivery must have caused no change in
either the total cost or total resale prices that Fertico paid and received.
240 Under the hypothetical, Fertico would recover $50 more than it would have
earned absent the breach.
241 Fertico Belgium S. A. v. Phosphate Chemicals Export Ass'n., Inc., 510 N.E.2d
334 (N.Y. 1987).
242 See supra notes 235-40 and accompanying text for a discussion of the windfall
given by the Fertico court.
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a middleman should have to prove that he had the capacity to
earn at least as much profit as if there had been no breach. 243
The middleman in Fertico was able to prove this, but to recover
cover damages under U C.C. sections 2-714(1) and 2-712, a
middleman should have to show two additional elements: (1)
that the retention and resale of the late-delivered goods was
reasonable; 2" and (2) that there was a loss of profit despite
retention and resale of the late-delivered goods. 245
A. A Reasonable Acceptance of Late Deliveries
If a middleman accepts a late delivery and seeks to recover
cover damages for goods purchased to replace the late-delivered
goods under a resale contract, the middleman will have to seek
recovery under U C.C. section 2-714(1). This section allows
buyers to recover damages caused by accepted goods "in any
manner which is reasonable.' '246 Because the cover remedy was
not designed for accepting buyers, 247 to prove that cover is a
"reasonable" form of recovery under U C.C. section 2-714(1),
a middleman should have to prove, at the very least, that
rejection and revocation were impracticable. The Fertico court
held that Fertico's retention and resale of late-delivered goods
was reasonable because Fertico had paid for the goods on a
letter of credit. 248 The court did not adequately explain why
Fertico could not have rejected or revoked its acceptance of
the goods. Had Fertico rejected and purchased replacement
goods to fulfill its existing obligation, it could have sued Phos-
chem for cover damages and purchased more fertilizer to fulfill
the second resale contract. 249
Although the Fertico court failed to show that Fertico's
actions were reasonable, there may be situations where a mid-
'4 See supra notes 73-81 and accompanying text.
244 See infra notes 246-53 and accompanying text.
24 See infra notes 254-56 and accompanying text.
Z 6 U.C.C. § 2-714(1).
24 See supra notes 213-17 and accompanying text.
'A Fertico, 510 N.E.2d at 338.
2" Assuming that there was not a shortage of goods on the market, Fertico could
have rejected and saved incidental damages that were incurred to store the fertilizer
for four months.
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dleman could accept and still receive cover damages under
U C.C. sections 2-714(1) and 2-712. In the Chemetron case,250
a court held that a middleman purchaser of goods delivered in
an insufficient quantity could recover cover damages notwith-
standing its acceptance of the faulty tender Because of a short-
age of goods on the market, the middleman in Chemetron
would have been in an even worse position had it rejected the
insufficient deliveries. 25' Therefore, the Chemetron court al-
lowed the middleman to accept the insufficient quantity, cover
for the amount not delivered, retain the profit from the resale
of the insufficient delivery, and sue for the increased cost of
the cover goods. 212
Perhaps a middleman who retains and resells late-delivered
goods could show that the goods had to be accepted and resold
because a rejection would have reduced the total volume of
goods it could have resold in a given period of time. If a
middleman could prove that a rejection of late-delivered goods
would have caused it harm, it might receive the same treatment
the Chemetron court gave a middleman who accepted and
resold an insufficient delivery 253
B. Proof of Cover Damages
The Fertico decision created a windfall because the court
concluded that the middleman's total profit was unaffected by
the late delivery 254 Therefore, an award of cover damages
actually placed the middleman in a better position than he
would have been in absent the breach. 255
From an economic standpoint, there may be situations where
a middleman should be allowed to keep resale profits from
late-delivered goods and recover a portion of the increased cost
of replacement goods. If, for example, a middleman normally
buys goods in a stable long-term market, he might prove that
250 Chemetron Corp. v. McLouth Steel Corp., 381 F Supp. 245 (N.D. I11. 1974).
21, See supra notes 175-85 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Che-
metron case.
212 See supra notes 175-85 and accompanying text.
253 Id.
214 See supra note 239.
" See supra notes 235-40 and accompanying text.
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a replacement purchase on the spot market made necessary by
a late delivery was more costly than a purchase normally would
have been on the long-term market. In other words, although
a middleman might have two profitable resales notwithstanding
a late delivery, he might show that his total profit from the
two transactions was reduced because he had to pay more for
a quick purchase to replace the late-delivered goods, and that
had there been no breach, the purchase necessary to fulfill a
second resale would have been less costly on a long-term mar-
ket. If a middleman could show this by proof of market con-
ditions, he should be allowed to keep profits derived from the
resale of the late-delivered goods and recover cover damages.
The cover damages would then represent profits lost as a con-
sequence of the seller's breach and would be necessary to place
the aggrieved middleman in the same position he would have
been in had there been no breach. 256
CONCLUSION
The Fertico257 decision represents an expansion of buyers'
remedies. Although the Fertico analysis gave a windfall to a
middleman, 258 there may be situations in which a middleman
could resell late-delivered goods, keep the profits, and recover
part of the expense of higher priced replacement goods.
25 9 If
other courts follow New York's precedent, they must carefully
16 An accepting middleman buyer who is able to show an increased cost due to
the late delivery of goods might prefer to seek a "quasi-cover" remedy in the form
of consequential damages available to an accepting buyer under U.C.C. §§ 2-714(3)
and 2-715(2). By looking to these sections for recovery, the middleman buyer could
avoid the somewhat tenuous argument proposed by the Fertico court, i.e., that one
who accepts late-delivered goods can recover under U.C.C. § 2-712. See supra notes
213-26 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Fertico court's combination of
the cover remedy of U.C.C. § 2-712 and the recovery of damages under U.C.C. § 2-
714(1). If a middleman buyer dealing in two buy-sell transactions attempted to recover
the increased cost caused by late-delivered goods, he might experience difficulty in
proving that "the seller at the time of contracting had reason. to know" of the
middleman's "particular requirements and needs." U.C.C. § 2-715(2)(a); see also
supra notes 90-197 and accompanying text concerning consequential damages.
21 Fertico Belgium S. A. v. Phosphate Chemicals Export Ass'n., Inc., 510 N.E.2d
334 (N.Y 1987).
2' See supra notes 235-40 and accompanying text.
21 See supra notes 241-56 and accompanying text.
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adhere to the remedial goal of the U C.C.. an aggrieved party
should only be placed in the position that it would have been
in had there been no breach. 260 If a middleman retains and
profitably resells late-delivered goods, he will have to prove
that he would have earned those resale profits (or even more
profit) notwithstanding the breach, if he is to keep the profit.261
A middleman would have to prove two other elements to re-
cover a portion of the cost of higher priced replacement goods:
(1) that retention and resale of the late-delivered goods was
reasonable; 262 and (2) that the total profit from the resale of
the retained goods and the replacement goods was actually less
than would have been made had there been no breach. 263
Whether a middleman could successfully prove these elements
is unknown. Nevertheless, the Fertico decision, though flawed,
could provide the impetus for such claims.
John Hackley
- U.C.C. § 1-106.
26 See supra notes 73-82 and accompanying text.
262 See supra notes 246-53 and accompanying text.
263 See supra notes 254-56 and accompanying text.
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